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LEARNING LESSONS FROM CLOUD 
INVESTIGATIONS IN EUROPE: 
BARGAINING ENFORCEMENT AND 
MULTIPLE CENTERS OF REGULATION IN 
DATA PROTECTION 
Asma A.I. Vranaki† 
Abstract 
The race is on for businesses and consumers to join the cloud.  From 
increased efficiency to low operational costs to scalability, reasons abound as 
to why we are adopting cloud solutions.  However, unleashing the potential of 
cloud ecosystems for companies and individuals has not been without 
difficulties.  Industry research has highlighted that data protection and privacy 
concerns, in particular, can often be one of the main inhibitors to the 
widespread adoption of cloud-based systems.  Lately, some U.S.-based cloud 
companies have been required to comply with European data protection laws 
through the regulatory process of investigation by European data protection 
authorities (“Cloud Investigations”). 
In this Article, I analyze selected empirical findings from my recent 
qualitative socio-legal research project where I have examined the 
investigations of companies providing cloud-based services (“Cloud 
Providers”) by European data protection authorities (EU DPAs) to reflect on 
the roles of data protection laws during such investigations. 
I advance two arguments.  First, a decentralized perspective on Cloud 
Investigations sheds a more comprehensive light on the roles of data 
protection laws during Cloud Investigations without assuming a priori that 
such laws have a privileged and static role in the regulatory process. 
Second, and relatedly, I argue that by “cutting off the King’s head,” we 
can understand more fully the dynamic and context-dependent roles of data 
protection laws during Cloud Investigations.  From time to time, law can be 
deployed to achieve the aims of the lawmakers or enforcers.  At other times, 
law can also be used as bargaining chips by EU DPAs and Cloud Providers to 
 
†   This Article is derived from the research that the author has undertaken for the “Accountability for 
Cloud” research project, which was funded by the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme.  
All references in this Article were current as at the time of writing. 
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obstruct or facilitate the negotiations during Cloud Investigations.  At other 
times still, law can often retreat from the field of action as other actors carry 
out the “act of government” to determine if and to what extent Cloud 
Providers are “accountable in reality.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The race is on for businesses and consumers to join the cloud.  From 
increased efficiency to low operational costs to scalability, reasons abound for 
why we are adopting cloud solutions.  Beyond the buzzwords, what is the 
cloud?  There is no single agreed-upon definition of cloud computing.  In 
essence, this term refers to the delivery of computing resources (for example, 
storage) as a service through a network (such as the Internet) on a scalable, 
pay-by-use (if not free) and on-demand basis.1 
Industry research has highlighted that regulatory and legal issues, such as 
data protection and privacy issues, can prevent the widespread adoption of 
cloud-based systems.2  For example, a cloud solution can involve a complex 
chain of Cloud Providers.3  In data protection terms, this may lead to several 
problems, including difficulties in determining which Cloud Providers are 
acting as data “controllers” or data “processors.”4  The data 
 
 1.  INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2012), 
https://ico.org.uk/media/1540/cloud_computing_guidance_for_organisations.pdf. 
 2.  See Industry’s Largest Cloud Computing Survey Reveals 5x Adoption of SaaS, NORTH BRIDGE, 
http://www.northbridge.com/industry-largest-cloud-computing-survey-reveals-5x-adoption-saas (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2016) (noting data security concerns serve as cloud inhibitors). 
 3.  INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, supra note 1, at 4, 6. 
 4.   See W. Kuan Hon et al., What Is Regulated as Personal Data in Clouds?, in CLOUD COMPUTING 
LAW 167, 168–83 (Christopher Millard ed., 2013) (explaining the difficulties in identifiability of controllers or 
processors).  A European Parliament directive defines “controller” as a “natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data.” Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2(d), of the European Parliament and of the Council 
 
No. 2] LESSONS FROM CLOUD INVESTIGATIONS 247 
“controller”/“processor” categorization is crucial under the current European 
data protection laws to determine and allocate data protection responsibilities. 
Lately, European data protection authorities (EU DPAs) have investigated 
many U.S.-based cloud companies (“Cloud Investigations”).5  That European 
regulators have so far investigated mostly U.S.-based cloud companies is 
perhaps not surprising, given that such companies have a sizeable market share 
of the European cloud market.6  EU DPAs are the statutory independent public 
regulatory bodies that have many functions, including enforcing data 
protection laws in the European Economic Area (EEA).7  Investigations refer 
to the power of EU DPAs to investigate data “controllers,” such as companies 
providing cloud-based services (“Cloud Providers”), in specific circumstances, 
including when an individual complains.8  The increase in Cloud Investigations 
raises interesting questions about how “personal data” are regulated by the 
regulatory tool of investigation and the roles of data protection laws during 
Cloud Investigations.  “Personal data” means “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person.”9 
Current data protection literature adopts a state-centric approach to data 
protection laws.10  From this viewpoint, data protection laws are viewed as 
static regulatory tools that are deployed in only one direction (for example, 
from the EU DPA to the Cloud Provider) to achieve the aims of the state 
through its legislative draftspersons and enforcers.11  As an illustration, many 
scholars approach data protection laws solely as binding rules—imposed by 
 
of 24 October 1995, 1995 O.J (L 281) 31, 38 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046.  The Data Protection Directive defines “processor” as 
“a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf 
of the controller.” Id. art. 2(e).  The Data Protection Directive will be replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR], http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679.  The GDPR enters into force on May 
24, 2016 and will apply on May 25, 2018. Id. art. 99. 
 5.  See, e.g., Press Release, Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), Google’s 
New Privacy Policy: Incomplete Information and Uncontrolled Combination of Data Across Services (Oct. 16, 
2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2012/201210 
16_press_release_google_privacy_cnil_en.pdf (providing details of such Cloud Investigations). 
 6.  Other factors, such as media reports of data breaches by U.S.-based Cloud Providers and complaints 
filed by EU-resident users, can also account for why U.S.-based Cloud Providers have been investigated. See 
Interview 1, infra note 140.  The interviews on which this Article is based are set forth in notes 140–42, infra.  
 7.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 28.  In different jurisdictions, several labels are used to 
denote the statutory independent public regulatory body that has the function of applying and enforcing data 
protection laws.  For example, in the UK the DPA is referred to as the “Information Commissioner” whereas 
in Italy the DPA is referred to as “Il Garante per la protezione dei dati personali.”  Some legislative 
frameworks, such as the Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, use the term “supervisory authorities” to refer 
to such bodies. 
 8.  Id. art. 28(3).  
 9.  Id. art. 2(a). 
 10.  E.g., András Jóri, Shaping vs Applying Data Protection Law: Two Core Functions of Data 
Protection Authorities, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 133 (2015); Maria Stella Righettini, Institutionalization, 
Leadership, and Regulative Policy Style: A France/Italy Comparison of Data Protection Authorities, 13 J. 
COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS 143 (2011). 
 11.  Id. 
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the state from a top-down direction—that create new legal obligations, powers, 
and actors, such as EU DPAs.12  Such scholars tend to analyze data protection 
laws from a mostly textual perspective.13  For instance, some writers focus on 
analyzing the inconsistent implementation of the Data Protection Directive.14  
The Data Protection Directive regulates the processing of personal data in EEA 
countries.15 
Data protection laws often seem to have a privileged role in regulating 
“personal data” in such writings because they are approached as the sole or 
principal objects of analysis.16  More recent works on data protection laws 
concede that social interactions, such as discussions among regulators, can also 
have an impact on how data protection laws are applied in practice.17  
However, such works still approach investigations as tools that are deployed in 
one direction, namely from the regulator to the regulatee, to achieve only the 
aims of the state as envisaged by the lawmakers and law enforcers.18 
In this Article, I analyze selected empirical findings from my recent 
qualitative socio-legal research project19 where I have examined EU DPAs’ 
investigations of Cloud Providers to reflect on the roles of data protection laws 
during Cloud Investigations.  I understand data protection laws as encompassing 
the relevant European directives and regulation, national data protection and 
related procedural laws, rulings from the national and European courts, and the 
guidance or the opinions from EU DPAs and the Article 29 Working Party 
(A29WP).20  Consequently, my understanding of law also encompasses “soft” 
laws, including the non-binding A29WP opinions. 
I advance two arguments.  First, a decentralized perspective on Cloud 
Investigations sheds a more comprehensive light on the roles of data protection 
laws during those investigations without assuming a priori that such laws have 
a privileged and static role in the regulatory process.  Second, I argue that by 
“cutting off the King’s head,” we can understand more fully the dynamic and 
context-dependent roles of data protection laws during Cloud Investigations.  
From time to time, law can be deployed to achieve the aims of the lawmakers 
 
 12.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 28. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  E.g., LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS 
(2002) (analyzing data protection laws); Jóri, supra note 10. 
 15.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 1(1). 
 16.  See, e.g., Charles D. Raab, Networks for Regulation: Privacy Commissioners in a Changing World, 
13 J. COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS 195 (2011) (analyzing the influential relationship between data protection laws 
and personal data). 
 17.  See, e.g., id. 
 18.  See, e.g., id. 
 19.  “Socio-legal studies” refers to the study of law in context. See generally DENIS J. GALLIGAN, LAW 
IN MODERN SOCIETY (2007). 
 20.  Relevant European directives include the Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, and Directive 
2002/58/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37.  The A29WP is an advisory body that is composed of representatives of the 
EU DPAs, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission. Article 29 Working 
Party, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm (last updated June 10, 
2015).  Relevant A29WP opinions include Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the 
Concepts of “Controller” and “Processor,” 264/10/EN, WP 169 (Feb. 16, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf. 
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or enforcers.  At other times, law can also be used as bargaining chips by EU 
DPAs and Cloud Providers to obstruct or facilitate the negotiations during 
Cloud Investigations. At other times still, law can retreat from the field of 
action as other actors regulate “personal data” to determine if and to what 
extent Cloud Providers are “accountable in reality.”21 
I pursue these arguments in the remaining six Parts.  Part II of this Article 
begins by providing a brief introduction to cloud computing and the data 
protection issues that can be raised by such technologies.  Part III goes on to 
critically evaluate some of the main provisions of the European data protection 
laws that apply to Cloud Investigations.  Part IV conceptualizes law in broader 
terms than a mere norm issued by the sovereign state, which is backed by 
sanctions and enforced by specific actors.  Part V explains the methodology of 
this Article.  In Part VI, I analyze selected empirical findings to evaluate how 
EU DPAs and Cloud Providers can often strategically use data protection laws 
in ways that have not been anticipated by the legislative draftsperson or 
enforcer, namely as bargaining tools.  Finally, in Part VII, I consider how 
multiple “centers of calculation” (for example, technological, social, and legal) 
rather than merely legal “centers of calculation” are involved during Cloud 
Investigations to highlight that data protection laws do not have a privileged 
and static role during Cloud Investigations. 
II. A PRIMER ON CLOUD COMPUTING 
The rapid pace of innovation in the information and communications 
technology sector means that we often encounter a new term like “cloud 
computing” that encapsulates an emerging innovation with a number of 
technical and commercial characteristics.  In this Part, I introduce the reader to 
cloud computing by paying attention to its service and deployment models.  I 
also underline how the data protection concerns raised by cloud ecosystems are 
very much tied to how such ecosystems are configured in terms of their service 
and deployment layers. 
For many, cloud computing signals a new phase in computing as it 
enables its users to access computing resources, such as storage and 
processing, stored on shared and remote systems, on-demand, irrespective of 
location, on an agile basis with metered pricing (if any) through a network.22  
Through its characteristics, including pooling, scalability, and on-demand, 
cloud computing enables its users to reduce their capital expenditure (such as 
the costs of purchasing hardware) and incur only operational costs.23  As an 
example, the website of a fashion store can often receive a high level of traffic 
at variable times, such as during the bank holiday sales.  Consequently, the 
store needs the flexibility to double or triple how much traffic its website can 
 
 21.  Interview 1, infra note 140. 
 22.  Easiest Way to Understand Cloud Computing, BISINFOTECH (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.bisinfo 
tech.com/blog/what-is-cloud-computing/. 
 23.  Id. 
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handle during these peak times.  If the store hosts its website on a cloud server, 
such as Storm on Demand, with a few clicks the store can instantaneously 
provision its server so that its website can handle the increased traffic level and 
scale it back down again after the traffic levels return to normal.24  The fashion 
store is billed on a metered basis, which means that it pays for only the utilized 
resources.25  This can be a far more cost-effective solution for the store than 
using a dedicated hosting solution, which would require the store to invest in, 
configure, and maintain a more powerful machine as well as retain the machine 
even when traffic levels have decreased.26 
Cloud services can be characterized by their service and deployment 
models.  In terms of service models, cloud-based solutions can involve one or 
more service models, typically Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a 
Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS).27  Put simply, an IaaS cloud 
(for example, Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud) offers access to raw 
computing resources, such as computing hardware.28  A PaaS cloud, such as 
Google App Engine, offers access to a computing platform that enables its 
customers to develop and run software applications.29  An SaaS cloud 
(Dropbox is an example of an SaaS cloud) offers its users access to a complete 
software application through a network.30  Cloud solutions can often involve 
different layers of cloud services, which results in a complex supply chain that 
may not always be apparent to the end user.31  As an illustration, a company 
can offer a calendar software to its clients as an SaaS.  However, the company 
hosts the software on an IaaS cloud that is owned and operated by another 
company.  In this example, it is often difficult for the end users to know which 
providers or sub-providers, other than the SaaS provider, are involved in 
delivering this service and the data protection responsibilities of such sub-
providers and providers. 
Cloud-based solutions can be delivered in various ways.  Typically, there 
are four main deployment models: private cloud, community cloud, public 
cloud, and hybrid cloud.32  In plain terms, a private cloud provides computing 
resources as a service within a virtualized environment using an underlying 
 
 24.  Cloud Hosting—A New Way to Think, STORM ON DEMAND, http://www.stormondemand.com/ 
servers/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 25.  Pricing, STORM ON DEMAND, http://www.stormondemand.com/pricing (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 26.  SIANI PEARSON, HP LABS, UK, PRIVACY, SECURITY AND TRUST IN CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (June 28, 
2012), http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2012/HPL-2012-80R1.pdf; Types of Hosting Services: From Shared 
Hosting to Cloud Servers (Infographic), ELASTICHOSTS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.elastichosts.com/ 
blog/from-shared-hosting-to-cloud-vps/. 
 27.  Demystifying SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS, SKYTAP (Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.skytap.com/blog/ 
demystifying-saas-paas-and-iaas/. 
 28.  Amazon EC2—Virtual Server Hosting, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 29.  App Engine, GOOGLE CLOUD PLATFORM, https://cloud.google.com/appengine/ (last visited Sept. 13, 
2016). 
 30.  DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 31.  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2012 on Cloud Computing, 1037/12/EN, WP 
196, at 6 (July 1, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf. 
 32.  Id. at 25. 
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pool of computing resources.33  The client benefits from the advantages of 
cloud computing, such as self-service and agility, while having greater control 
over the cloud environment because the client is the only entity that can access 
the pool of resources.34  Community clouds refer to cloud environments that 
are shared among limited groups of users with common requirements, such as 
security and privacy.35  Public clouds refer to cloud environments that are 
shared among multiple users who utilize the same computing resources, such 
as servers and storage.36  Finally, hybrid clouds involve a mix of private, 
community, and public clouds.37  One of the main differences between these 
four deployment models is that they provide their users with varying levels of 
control over data, which can lead to data protection issues.  For example, there 
are concerns about unauthorized data access in multi-tenant public cloud 
environments.38  In some cases, unauthorized data access can be addressed by 
various measures, including devising robust access policies and partitioning 
the data of tenants.39  However, in other cases, such as when sensitive personal 
data (for example, financial data) are processed in a public cloud, such 
measures may still be insufficient to ensure regulatory compliance.40 
III. CLOUD INVESTIGATIONS AND DATA PROTECTION LAWS: A CRITICAL 
EVALUATION 
Having explained some of the main characteristics of cloud computing 
and that the data protection concerns raised by cloud ecosystems are tied to 
these characteristics, in this Part, I critically analyze some of the main 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive that apply to Cloud Investigations.  
The Data Protection Directive provides the point of departure for most of the 
analysis, because EU DPAs apply the directive as nationally implemented.41  
Where relevant, I also discuss the national implementing laws. 
The Data Protection Directive has several aims, including harmonizing 
European data protection laws, protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of individuals, and promoting the trans-border flow of personal data.42  To 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 60 Percent of Virtualized Servers Will Be Less Secure than 
the Physical Servers They Replace Through 2012 (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/ 
1322414. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  THOMAS HAEBERLEN & LIONEL DUPRÉ, EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, CLOUD 
COMPUTING: BENEFITS, RISKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 22 (Dec. 2012), 
https://resilience.enisa.europa.eu/cloud-security-and-resilience/publications/cloud-computing-benefits-risks-
and-recommendations-for-information-security. 
 41.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 2; EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 
DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 19 
(Nov. 28, 2010) [hereinafter ROLE OF DPAS], http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Data-protection_ 
en.pdf. 
 42. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 2.  Such aims did not exist in a state of nature but 
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achieve these aims, the Data Protection Directive has established new legal 
actors (such as EU DPAs), rights, and obligations.43  The Data Protection 
Directive endows EU DPAs with a number of powers, including intervention 
and investigation.44  EEA countries have a large degree of discretion when they 
implement the Data Protection Directive nationally because many provisions 
of the Directive—including Article 28, the main provision setting out the 
investigatory powers of EU DPAs—are very broad and vague.45  Depending 
on the aims and foci of the investigations, other provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive may also be relevant. 
My empirical analysis has highlighted that, at a baseline, most Cloud 
Investigations aim to assess the legal compliance of Cloud Providers and 
enforce data protection laws in cases of non-compliance.46  However, 
depending on the context, some Cloud Investigations can also have other aims, 
including encouraging the Cloud Provider to adopt “best practice” 
recommendations that go beyond the letter of the law and educating the Cloud 
Provider about its data protection obligations.47  Cloud Investigations can also 
have different foci.  Some Cloud Investigations can focus on a limited number 
of processing operations and policies while other investigations can evaluate 
all the operations and policies of the company.48 
Four key issues are raised when the sweeping and indeterminate 
provisions of the Data Protection Directive—as nationally implemented—are 
applied to Cloud Investigations. 
First, Article 28(1) of the Data Protection Directive provides that EU 
DPAs should be fully autonomous regulatory bodies.49  In essence, this means 
that EU DPAs should not allow their administrative dependence on other 
actors, such as their financial dependence on governmental departments, to 
have an impact on their functional independence.50  Despite the salience of the 
independence criterion in the European data protection law regime, a recent 
review of the implementation of the Data Protection Directive by the EEA 
countries has highlighted that many EU DPAs have still not achieved full 
independence from other actors due to their limited financial resources.51  This 
 
emanated from their interactions with other relevant actors, such as national Member States and European 
institutions. 
 43.  See, e.g., id. art. 12 (providing “data subjects” with access rights); id. art. 2(h) (defining a “data 
subject” as an “identified or identifiable natural person”). 
 44.  Id. art. 28(3). 
 45.  Id. art. 28. 
 46.  E.g., Interviews 1 & 2, infra note 140.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  E.g., Interviews 1, 2 & 3, infra note 140. 
 49.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 28(1). 
 50.  Id.  The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that the “decision-making power [of EU 
DPAs should be] independent of any direct or indirect external influence.”  Case C-518/07, Comm’n v. 
Germany, 2010 E.C.R. I-1885, ¶ 19 (2010), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 
62007CJ0518. 
 51.  See Commission First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), 
at 12–13, COM (2003) 265 final (May 15, 2003) [hereinafter Commission First Report], http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0265:FIN:EN:PDF (reviewing member state 
implementation of the Data Protection Directive); ROLE OF DPAS, supra note 41 (analyzing data protection 
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can potentially raise issues about how and to what ends some EU DPAs 
exercise their powers, including their investigative powers.  In particular, my 
findings on how some EU DPAs manage their limited resources by using the 
assistance of other actors (for example, sub-contractors financed by the 
investigated Cloud Providers) raise critical questions about the potential 
influence of such actors during Cloud Investigations.52  To what extent might 
the Cloud Provider be able to influence the technical testing stage of the Cloud 
Investigation when it fully or partially bears the costs of hiring an independent 
technical expert?  EU DPAs can put in place safeguards, including contractual 
clauses, providing that the expert will act only under the strict instructions of 
the regulator.53  However, even in such cases, it is possible that such financial 
arrangements may affect the outcomes of the investigation.54 
Second, although Article 28 of the Data Protection Directive endows EU 
DPAs with many powers, including investigative and intervention powers, the 
inconsistent implementation of the directive means that many EU DPAs are 
still not endowed with full powers.55  As an example, the Hellenic DPA does 
not have the power to bring a case directly before the judicial authorities.56  
This may have an impact on the range of actions available to EU DPAs if a 
Cloud Provider refuses to implement some of its recommendations after a 
Cloud Investigation.57  Even in cases in which EU DPAs have similar powers, 
such as the powers to impose a monetary penalty, there can still be national 
differences.58  EU DPAs can often have different maximum fine levels.59  In 
practice, this means that there can often be inconsistent sanctions applied by 
EU DPAs after Cloud Investigations.  When EU DPAs impose varying 
sanctions when investigating the same Cloud Provider for substantially similar 
breaches, this can have an impact on the effectiveness of the law’s sanctioning 
powers.60 
Recently, some EU DPAs have imposed different levels of fines 
following their investigations into the compliance of the privacy policy of 
 
authorities and their effectiveness in protecting fundamental rights in data protection). 
 52.  E.g., Interviews 1 & 4, infra note 140. 
 53.  Asma Vranaki, Cloud Investigations by European Data Protection Authorities: An Empirical 
Account, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 518 (John Rothchild ed., 2016). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See Commission First Report, supra note 51, at 13. 
 56.  Nomos (1997:2472) Prostasia toy Atomoy apo thn Epexergasia Dedomenwn Proswpikoy 
Charakthra [on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data], EPHEMERIS TES 
KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 1997, B:967, art. 19(1)(e) (Greece), http://www. 
dpa.gr/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/APDPX/ENGLISH_INDEX/LEGAL%20FRAMEWORK/LAW%202472-97-
NOV2013-EN.PDF. 
 57.  Vranaki, supra note 53. 
 58.  EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ACCESS TO DATA PROTECTION REMEDIES 
IN EU MEMBER STATES 21 (2013) [hereinafter DATA PROTECTION REMEDIES], http://fra.europa.eu/sites/ 
default/files/fra-2014-access-data-protection-remedies_en_0.pdf. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Recent research by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights concludes that the inconsistent 
fining powers of EEA countries is an obstacle to the effectiveness of the Data Protection Directive. See DATA 
PROTECTION REMEDIES, supra note 58. 
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Google Inc. (“Google”) with the applicable data protection laws.61  For 
example, the French DPA levied a maximum fine of €150,000 against Google 
and also required the company to display its order on the company’s website 
for forty-eight hours.62  The Spanish DPA fined Google €900,000, while the 
Dutch DPA will impose an incremental penalty payment amounting to €15 
million if Google fails to implement specific changes by a set deadline.63  On 
the other side of the English Channel, the UK DPA recently opted not to fine 
Google and successfully negotiated an undertaking that requires Google to 
implement specific changes to its privacy policy within a prescribed time 
frame.64  Many stakeholders have criticized the divergent approaches of the 
EU DPAs in the Google investigations.65 
Third, Article 28(3) of the Data Protection Directive specifies some of the 
investigative powers of an EU DPA: “powers of access to data forming the 
subject-matter of processing operations and powers to collect all the 
information necessary for the performance of its supervisory duties.”66  As this 
provision does not provide an exhaustive list of the investigative tasks of EU 
DPAs, these tasks have been inconsistently fleshed out either in national 
implementing laws or through the practices of EU DPAs.67  As an illustration, 
EU DPAs, such as the French DPA, have the power to undertake online 
inspections, while others do not.68  It also means that non-legal factors, such as 
financial or external pressures faced by EU DPAs, can often have an impact on 
the tasks deployed during an investigation.69  For instance, some of the smaller 
 
 61.  See, e.g., Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés [CNIL] [National Commission 
for Information Technology and Civil Liberties], June 10, 2013, Decision No. 2013-025 Giving Formal Notice 
to the Company Google Inc. [hereinafter CNIL Decision], http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/D2013-
025_10_Jun_2013_GOOGLE_INC_EN.pdf (ordering Google to comply with the French Data Protection Act). 
 62.  See Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 78-17 of 
January 6, 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, art. 45, § I, amended by Law 
2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1245/file/ 
2c6afeb365cf84afa6d0de952262.pdf (listing sanctions that the Commission may impose); Google Served 
Maximum Fine by French Data Protection Authority over Privacy Policy Failings, OUT-LAW.COM (Jan. 10, 
2014), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/january/google-served-maximum-fine-by-french-data-protect 
ion-authority-over-privacy-policy-failings/. 
 63.  Press Release, Dutch Data Prot. Auth., CBP Issues Sanction to Google for Infringements Privacy 
Policy (Dec. 15, 2014), https://cbpweb.nl/en/news/cbp-issues-sanction-google-infringements-privacy-policy. 
 64.  Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) Undertaking, by Kent Walker, Senior Vice-President & General 
Counsel of Google Inc., on behalf of Google Inc. (Jan. 30, 2015), https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-
taken/undertakings/1043170/google-inc-privacy-policy-undertaking.pdf.  For more on the UK DPA’s power to 
impose a monetary penalty, see Data Protection Act 1998 (UK), §§ 55A–E (UK). 
 65.  See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, at 
5, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en. 
pdf. 
 66.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 28(3). 
 67.  J. C. Bruno & Elsa Crozatier, Compliance with the European Union Directive in the Transfer of 
Employee Personal Data to U.S. Affiliates, MICH. B.J., Nov. 2004, at 48. 
 68.  Loi 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation, [Law 2014-344 of March 17, 2014 on 
Consumption], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028738036&categorieLien=id. 
 69.  See, e.g., Interviews 1, 2 & 3, infra note 140. 
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EU DPAs with limited financial resources tend to favor investigative practices 
that are not as draining on their resources.  Contract and code review are 
examples of these types of tasks.70  This divergence can often have an impact 
on the outcomes of investigations generally.  In the cloud context, depending 
on the Cloud Investigation in question, EU DPAs that carry broader and more 
detailed investigative tasks (such as code testing rather than code review) are 
more likely to generate a fuller evaluation of the Cloud Provider’s legal 
compliance than the regulators who do not conduct such detailed compliance 
assessments.71 
Fourth, the wide ambit of Article 28 also means that certain aspects of 
Cloud Investigations, such as what the Cloud Provider can expect before, 
during, and after a Cloud Investigation, are inconsistently fleshed out at a 
national level.72  Consequently, investigated Cloud Providers can often 
encounter varying degrees of openness, transparency, and consistency in 
different jurisdictions.73  It is evident that European laws have to be transposed 
in such a way that they are compatible with the legal system of each EEA 
country.74  However, the inconsistent guidance that EU DPAs provide to Cloud 
Providers on Cloud Investigations causes significant problems for such 
companies.75  Such organizations have more or less information about the 
process in question depending on the territory in question.76  For example, 
while jurisdictions like Ireland are relatively open and transparent about how 
they conduct their investigations, other jurisdictions, such as France, do not 
have similar public guidance.77 
 
 70.  Interview 3, infra note 140. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Compare Data Protection Act 1988 (Act No. 25/1988) (Ir.), § 24, amended by Data Protection 
(Amendment) Act 2003 (Act. No. 6/2003) (Ir.) (giving the Irish DPA the power to authorize a person, 
including another EU DPA, in writing, to exercise a number of powers during investigations, including the 
power to obtain information from the investigated data controller) with Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à 
l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and 
Individual Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, amended by Law 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004 and Décret 2005-1309 du 20 octobre 2005 
pris pour l’application de la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux 
libertésthe [Decree 2005-1309 of October 20, 2005 enacted for the application of Act No 78-17 of January 6, 
1978 on Data Processing, Files and Individual Liberties], amended by Decree 2007-451 of March 25, 2007 
(regulating the investigative powers of the French DPA but not authorizing the French DPA to appoint another 
party as an “authorised officer” during its investigations); see also Caroline Donnelly, EU Data Protection 
Regulation: What the EC Legislation Means for Cloud Providers, COMPUTER WEEKLY (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/EU-Data-Protection-Regulation-What-the-EC-legislation-means-for-
cloud-providers. 
 73.  See, e.g., Cloud Provider Interviews, infra note 141. 
 74.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47. 
 75.  See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Declaration of the Article 29 Working Party on 
Enforcement, 12067/04/EN, WP 101 (Nov. 25, 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/ 
documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2004/wp101_en.pdf (making the case for the need to overcome 
national differences and move towards “synchronized national enforcement actions”); Yves Poullet, EU Data 
Protection Policy. The Directive 95/46/EC: Ten Years After, 22 COMPUTER L. & SEC. R. 206, 207 (2006) 
(describing the problems companies face in dealing with the “complexity of managing compliance across 
multiple sets of standards”). 
 76.  See, e.g., Cloud Provider Interviews, infra note 141. 
 77.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DATA PROTECTION COMM’R [OF IRELAND], GUIDE TO AUDIT PROCESS 
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Relatedly, many companies rely on the non-binding advice provided by 
EU DPAs to assess their data compliance before the start of the Cloud 
Investigations.78  However, such advice can often be inconsistent with one 
another.  As an example, the Irish DPA advises data “controllers” operating in 
a single tenant cloud arrangement to discharge their security obligations by 
directly auditing the security measures put in place by the company that 
provides them with their cloud-based service.79  It is questionable to what 
extent it is practical and feasible for data “controllers” to directly inspect the 
premises of such organizations.  Conversely, the UK DPA advises data 
“controllers” to discharge their security obligations by requiring an 
independent third party to conduct a detailed security audit of the cloud 
services they use as well as provide a copy of this assessment to their 
prospective customers.80  The inconsistent advice that Cloud Providers can 
often receive from EU DPAs about data protection in the cloud can be partly 
explained by the fact that EU DPAs operate at a national rather than 
transnational level when producing such guidance.81 
In practice, such inconsistent guidance means that the data “controllers” 
operating in various EEA countries may often have to rely on disparate 
national guidance when determining their data protection compliance before or 
during a Cloud Investigation.82  Additionally, many of my EU DPA 
respondents have argued that national guidance on cloud computing plays an 
important role during Cloud Investigations.83  For instance, this information 
guides the investigative staff of the EU DPA by reminding the team of cloud-
centric matters, such as the importance of avoiding a “one size fits all”84 
approach.85  Thus, it is crucial for such guidance to share a common baseline 
that reflects a European perspective on the regulation of cloud data.  This is 
particularly important given that some Cloud Investigations can often involve 
formal or informal cooperation between EU DPAs.86 
Finally, one of my key empirical findings was that so far many Cloud 
Investigations seem to tackle general data protection issues rather than cloud-
specific ones.87  When I raised this issue with my EU DPA respondents, they 
all unanimously stated that they did not view an investigation of a cloud-based 
 
(Aug. 2014), https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/GuidetoAuditProcessAug2014.pdf (setting 
out the guidance for investigations that the Irish DPA undertakes of its own volition pursuant to the Data 
Protection (Amendment) Act 2003, infra note 133, § 10(1A)). 
 78.  See, e.g., Interview 2, infra note 140. 
 79.  Data Protection “In the Cloud”, DATA PROTECTION COMM’R [OF IRELAND] (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/03-07-12-Cloud-Computing/1221.htm. 
 80.  INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, supra note 1, ¶ 58. 
 81.  The Proposed General Data Protection Regulation: The Consistency Mechanism Explained, EUR. 
COMM’N (June 2, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/130206_en.htm. 
 82.  See, e.g., Cloud Provider Interviews, infra note 141. 
 83.  See id. 
 84.  INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, supra note 1, ¶ 35. 
 85.  E.g., Interviews 1, 2 & 3, infra note 140. 
 86.  Id.; see also Vranaki, supra note 53. 
 87.  E.g., All Interviews, infra notes 140–42. 
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company differently from an investigation of a non-cloud-based organization.88  
This is quite surprising given the characteristics of the cloud, such as its 
service and deployment models, which can often give rise to specific and 
intricate data protection concerns.89  Many EU DPAs publicly recognize this 
point.90  As few EU DPAs have published a public report after their Cloud 
Investigations, it is difficult to assess precisely to what extent such 
investigations do or do not reflect cloud-centric issues.91  However, my 
analysis of the published Cloud Investigations reports has been quite 
instructive on this point.  Due to space constraints, I focus only on the report 
published by the Dutch DPA after its investigation of WhatsApp Inc. 
(“WhatsApp”).92  I have chosen this report because it is fairly representative of 
how other EU DPAs have approached cloud-centric data protection issues in 
their external investigation reports. 
In brief, the Dutch and Canadian DPAs investigated WhatsApp in 2012 
(“WhatsApp Investigation”).93  WhatsApp is a popular cross-platform94 mobile 
messaging application that enables its users to send and receive different types 
of instant messages, including voice95 and media96 messages.97  Both DPAs 
found WhatsApp in breach of their national data protection laws for several 
 
 88.  E.g., Interviews 1, 2, 3 & 4, infra note 140. 
 89.  Jaydip Sen, Security and Privacy Issues in Cloud Computing, in STANDARDS AND 
STANDARDIZATION: CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGIES, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS 1376–78 (2015). 
 90.  See, e.g., Data Protection “In the Cloud”, supra note 79; INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, supra note 1. 
 91.  See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Google Privacy Policy: Main Findings and 
Recommendations, Oct. 16, 2012, app. to Article 29 Letter, infra note 137 [hereinafter Article 29 Main 
Findings], http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/GOOGLE_PRIVACY_POLICY-_RECOMMENDATI 
ONS-FINAL-EN.pdf; DATA PROTECTION COMM’R [OF IRELAND], FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD: REPORT OF AUDIT 
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://dataprotection.ie/documents/facebook%20report/final%20report/report.pdf; CNIL 
Decision, supra note 61, at 6.  The CNIL decision is not a “report” as such but rather a formal notice issued by 
the French DPA to Google Inc. following its investigation of the compliance of the privacy policies of Google 
Inc. with French data protection laws.  CNIL Decision, supra note 61.  However, this formal decision 
highlights the main axes of evaluation and decision-making carried out during the investigation. Id. 
 92.  See DUTCH DATA PROT. AUTH., REPORT ON THE DEFINITIVE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA FOR THE “WHATSAPP” MOBILE APPLICATION BY WHATSAPP INC. 
(informal trans., Jan. 15, 2013) [hereinafter WHATSAPP FINDINGS], https://cbpweb.nl/sites/default/files/ 
downloads/mijn_privacy/rap_2013-whatsapp-dutchdpa-final-findings-en.pdf. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See About WhatsApp, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).  
WhatsApp can be used on various mobile operating systems including Android, Windows Phone, and iOS. See 
Is My Device Supported?, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/20951556 (last visited Sept. 
13, 2016).  iOS is a mobile operating system that has been developed by Apple Inc. See iOS 10, APPLE, 
http://www.apple.com/in/ios/ios-10/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).  For more information, see Frequently Asked 
Questions, WHATSAPP, http://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 95.  See What Is Voice Messaging?, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/25118341 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2016).  Voice messages refer to messages by which the WhatsApp user can send an 
audio message to another WhatsApp user or a group of WhatsApp users by using the microphone 
functionality. Id. 
 96.  See Sending Media and Other Data, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/ 
23766198 (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).  Media messages are messages through which WhatsApp users can 
exchange media content, such as photos, with one another. Id. 
 97.  Press Release, Office of the Privacy Comm’r of Can., WhatsApp’s Violation of Privacy Law Partly 
Resolved After Investigation by Data Protection Authorities (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.prnewswire.com/ 
news-releases/whatsapps-violation-of-privacy-law-partly-resolved-after-investigation-by-data-protection-
authorities-188654711.html. 
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reasons, including security.98  The rest of this Part critically evaluates the 
decisions of the Dutch DPA on WhatsApp’s data retention and encryption 
practices to highlight their weaknesses in the cloud context. 
When considering some of WhatsApp’s data retention practices (for 
example, the retention period of the personal data of inactive users or non-
WhatsApp users) the Dutch DPA did not consider how WhatsApp handles the 
data after the expiry of the retention period.99  In other words, the Dutch DPA 
did not examine WhatsApp’s data deletion practices.100 
This is surprising given the close connection between data retention and 
data deletion in the Data Protection Directive.101  It would have been important 
for the Dutch DPA to analyze how data deletion takes place.  Does WhatsApp 
delete only pointers to the data?  When are the data permanently (as far as 
technically possible) deleted?  What types of information does WhatsApp 
store?  Does WhatsApp delete all relevant data (including data fragments) at 
all storage points?  Is data deletion permanent or can deleted data be 
recovered?  How do WhatsApp’s storage practices differ from platform to 
platform (for example, iOS)?  These are important questions that the Dutch 
DPA should have considered to understand fully the data deletion and retention 
practices of WhatsApp. 
Initially, the Dutch DPA determined that WhatsApp was in breach of the 
Dutch data protection laws because WhatsApp transmitted user messages in an 
unencrypted form.102  However, at the later stages of the WhatsApp 
Investigation, the Dutch DPA was satisfied that WhatsApp did not breach the 
law on this point since by then WhatsApp had implemented end-to-end 
encryption for its user messages.103  From the investigation report, it is unclear 
whether the Dutch DPA fully tested the end-to-end encryption implemented by 
WhatsApp.104  Does WhatsApp have an effective key management policy in 
place?  Does the encryption method cover all or specific types of user 
messages, such as audio and photographs?  Is the encryption key secure on all 
platforms on which WhatsApp can be installed?105  These are some of the main 
questions that the Dutch DPA should have pursued.  A recent forensic analysis 
of WhatsApp’s installation on the Android platform (the platform tested during 
the WhatsApp Investigation) has concluded that WhatsApp uses the same 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 192-bit encryption key for all 
 
 98.  See WHATSAPP FINDINGS, supra note 92, at 3 (“At the start of the investigation, the Dutch DPA and 
the OPC identified two security shortcomings . . . .  For this reason, WhatsApp was acting in breach of the 
provisions of article 13 of the Wbp.”). 
 99.  Id. at 33.  
 100.  Id. 
 101. Guide to Data Protection: Retaining Personal Data (Principle 5), INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, 
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/principle-5-retention/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 102.  WHATSAPP FINDINGS, supra note 92. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 6 n.15, 7 n.17. 
 105.  For more on the security issues that can be raised on Android and iOS, see Robert Lemos, Android 
vs. iOS Security Comparisons Get Complicated, EWEEK (July 31, 2014), http://www.eweek.com/security/ 
android-vs.-ios-security-comparisons-get-complicated.html. 
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end-to-end WhatsApp chat messages.106  However, until recently, WhatsApp 
did not encrypt other content, including audio, videos, and photographs.107 
Having critically analyzed some of the main legal provisions relevant to 
Cloud Investigations, in the remaining Parts of this Article, I use a 
decentralized approach to law and Cloud Investigations to shed light on the 
roles of data protection laws during this regulatory process.  Before delving 
into this matter, though, it is first helpful to understand what this decentralized 
approach entails. 
IV. ORDERING “AT A DISTANCE”: CLOUD INVESTIGATIONS  
AND DATA PROTECTION LAWS 
My decentralized view on law and Cloud Investigations is derived from 
the ideas developed by Michel Foucault and other authors who build on his 
work.108  Four interconnected concepts inform my view on Cloud 
Investigations and law, namely, power, “governmentality,” “centers of 
calculation,” and “action at a distance.”109 
In brief, Foucault argues that power does not emanate from only one 
single source or one single direction (for example, the state or top-down).110  
Rather, power emanates from multiple sources and directions (that is, also 
bottom-up).111  Power constitutes “the multiplicity of force relations immanent 
in the sphere in which [it] operate[s] and which constitute [its] own 
organization.”112  Despite not emanating from a single source of central 
authority, power is omnipresent because: 
[I]t is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or 
rather in every relation from one point to another.  Power is 
everywhere, not because it embraces everywhere, but because it 
comes from everywhere.113 
As such, power can only be exercised.  Power is not the appertunance of 
the privileged few.114  Rather, power is the “overall effect of [relevant] 
 
 106.  Neha S. Thakur, Forensic Analysis of WhatsApp on Android Smartphones (Aug. 6, 2013) 
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, Univ. of New Orleans), http://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=2736&context=td. 
 107.  End-to-End Encryption, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2016).   
 108.  For example, Graham Burchell, Mitchell Dean, Colin Gordon, Bruno Latour, John Law, Thomas 
Lemke, Peter Miller, Pat O’Malley, Nikolas Rose, and Marianna Valverde, whose works are cited in this Part. 
 109.  See, e.g., Bruce Curtis, Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery, 
27 CAN. J. SOC. 505 (2002) (describing Foucault’s concept of governmentality); Heike Jöns, Centre of 
Calculation, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GEOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 158 (2011) (describing “centre[s] of 
calculation”); ANDREW BARRY ET AL., FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON 43 (1996) (describing “action at a 
distance”). 
 110.  See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (1978).  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 92. 
 113.  Id. at 93. 
 114.  Id. 
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strategic positions.”115 
“Governmentality” is apposite here as it facilitates our understanding of 
how the relationships between multiple actors are strategically organized.116  
“Governmentality” refers to the “conduct of conduct”117 or in “the broad 
sense . . . [to] techniques and procedures for directing human behavior . . . 
[g]overnment of children . . . of souls and consciences . . . of a household, of a 
state, or of oneself” to achieve definite and shifting ends and with often 
unpredictable outcomes, effects, or consequences.118  “Governmentality” 
enables us to analyze the attempts of multiple authorities and agencies to shape 
the conduct of actors through complex webs of knowledge, techniques, and 
tactics to achieve “economy” for the population, which becomes crucial in 
defining the aims of government.119  Government refers to “an activity that 
undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under 
the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to 
them.”120 
By thinking of a Cloud Investigation in terms of “governmentality,” I 
analyze it as a means of ordering relations between relevant actors in order to 
achieve specific ends, such as protecting personal data rights.121  
“Governmentality” highlights the mundane, intricate, and diversified practices, 
routines, skills, and bodies of knowledge that interconnect to render the field of 
governance amenable to intervention by multiple actors during Cloud 
Investigations.122  It also underscores the new forms of inquiry, such as code 
testing, that shed light on the data protection compliance of the investigated 
companies in order to achieve particular aims, for example, protecting  
personal data rights. 
The “governmentality” perspective also draws our attention to how 
“inscriptions,” such as the annotations made by the Cloud Providers when 
filling out the questionnaires of the EU DPAs, enable power to be exercised 
 
 115.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 26–27 (1977). 
 116.  For more on governmentality, see Nikolas Rose et al., Governmentality, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
83 (2006) and Thomas Lemke, The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucualt’s Lecturer at the College de France 
on Neo-Liberal Governmentality, 30 ECON. & SOC’Y 190 (2001). 
 117.  See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 
87 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (describing the concept of governmentality as a phenomenon); 
MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY 17–24 (2nd ed. 2010) 
(expanding on Foucault’s definition and arguing that there are three key elements that can be derived from this 
definition, namely, the degree of calculation as to how conduct is guided, the way in which an individual 
conducts himself or herself, and the regulation of an individual’s behavior in accordance with a specific 
standard or norm). 
 118.  Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living, in 1 ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH: 
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1954–1984, at 81 (Paul Rabinow ed., Robert Hurley trans., 1997); 
see also Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 1 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
 119.  Gordon, supra note 118, at 1. 
 120.  Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, in 1 ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH: 
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1954–1984, at 67 (Paul Rabinow ed., Robert Hurley trans., 1997). 
 121.  Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 
95 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
 122.  Id. at 101. 
No. 2] LESSONS FROM CLOUD INVESTIGATIONS 261 
over actors that may be distant from one another.123  “Inscriptions”—or 
material and graphical representations of a thing in a durable or mobile form, 
such as a tabular representation of the storage options of the cloud service—
become key here as they provide significant information to actors such as the 
EU DPA’s legal and technical staff so that they can later “act upon” or attempt 
to order elements that are spatially and organizationally distant from them.124  
Data centers located in various jurisdictions are examples of such elements.  
Numerous “inscriptions” generated from different locales—such as the 
“inscriptions” made by the software engineer when designing a specific 
technology and the “inscriptions” made by the legal advisers when amending 
or drafting a specific contract, for example a Privacy Notice—are aggregated, 
compared, compiled, and analyzed by the EU DPA during the Cloud 
Investigation.125  These heterogeneous “inscriptions” are brought together in 
one local “center of calculation,” such as the office of the commissioner of an 
EU DPA, to enable this local center to act upon the entity in question.126  
Power here is very much an “achievement,” which depends in part on 
constantly harnessing multiple sources of information about the data 
processing practices and operations of the Cloud Provider.127 
“Governmentality” is particularly useful when studying Cloud 
Investigations because this perspective enables me to avoid two key problems 
found in the data protection literature on the powers of EU DPAs.  First, the 
“governmentality” perspective prevents me from limiting my analysis to the 
actions of the state and its agents only.  Second, the “governmentality” 
perspective enables me to conceive of law in broader terms than the current 
data protection law literature does.  Consequently, I do not approach law only 
as a binding set of rules that are complied with, breached, or enforced. This 
vantage point, often used in the data protection literature, focuses only on the 
determinate side of law in the sense of definite norms to be complied with.128 
Importantly, the “governmentality” perspective sheds light on law’s 
responsiveness when it is applied in a specific context.129  Just like other laws, 
data protection laws do not operate in a vacuum but constantly engage with 
other sources of power, resistance, and so on when they are applied in 
practice.130  Consequently, applying data protection laws is an “import-export 
 
 123.  See Bruno Latour, Visualisation and Cognition: Drawing Things Together, in REPRESENTATIONS IN 
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 19, 35–44 (Michael E. Lynch & Steve Woolgar eds., 1990); John Law, On the Methods 
of Long Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation and the Portuguese Route to India, in POWER, ACTION AND 
BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE?, 32 SOCIOLOGICAL R. MONOGRAPH 234, 251 (John Law ed., 
1986); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1, 31 (1990). 
 124.  Latour, supra note 123, at 8. 
 125.  Id. at 13. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Miller & Rose, supra note 123, at 18. 
 129.  INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE FEDERATION OF EUR., ISFE SUBMISSION ON CONSULTATION ON THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA 6 (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contributions/organisations/isfe_en.pdf. 
 130.  See BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT 55 
(Marina Brilman & Alain Pottage trans., 2009) (“[L]aw, like nature, abhors a vacuum . . . .”).  
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job” since data protection laws have an impact on the site of its application and 
vice versa.131 
Having outlined the main concepts that inform my analysis, next I deal 
briefly with the methodology that underpins this Article. 
V. METHODS 
This Article draws on three main qualitative data collection methods, 
namely, documentary analysis; observation; and interviews of seven DPAs, 
four multinational Cloud Providers, and the representatives of two European 
institutions.132  Qualitative methods enabled me to examine in detail the 
experiences and practices of the actors participating in Cloud Investigations. 
I analyzed several documents, including the current133 and future134 
European data protection laws; press releases by relevant stakeholders, 
including the European Commission135 and the investigated Cloud 
Providers;136 correspondence between the EU DPAs and Cloud Providers 
during Cloud Investigations;137 and published Cloud Investigation reports.138  
Additionally, I collected data through observation during the Fourth European 
Data Protection Days (EDPD) Conference in 2014—a key data protection 
conference attended by relevant stakeholders.139  Attending the EDPD 
Conference enabled me to approach potential interview respondents and collect 
information about current or future Cloud Investigations. 
Finally, interviewing enabled me to consolidate my background 
knowledge about Cloud Investigations and develop a comprehensive 
understanding of how Cloud Investigations are used in practice to regulate 
 
 131.  Id. at 123. 
 132.  At times, I interviewed more than one person working for the DPAs, especially when addressing 
large DPAs. 
 133.  E.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14, 2003, BGBL. I at 66, 
amended by Gesetz [G], Feb. 25, 2015, BGBL. I at 162, art. 1 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_bdsg/englisch_bdsg.html#p0008; Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers 
et aux libertés [Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227, 
amended by Law 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/ 
1245/file/2c6afeb365cf84afa6d0de952262.pdf; Data Protection Act 1988 (Act No. 25/1988) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1988/act/25/enacted/en/html; Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003 (Act. 
No. 6/2003) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2003/act/6/enacted/en/html; Data Protection Directive, 
supra note 4. 
 134.  GDPR, supra note 4. 
 135.  E.g., Press Release, Viviane Reding, Vice-President, Eur. Comm’n, Strong and Independent Data 
Protection Authorities: The Bedrock of the EU’s Data Protection Reform (May 3, 2012), http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-316_en.htm. 
 136.  E.g., Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM 
(Nov. 29, 2011), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2011/11/our-commitment-to-the-facebook-community/. 
 137.  E.g., Letter from Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to Larry Page, Chief Exec. Officer, 
Google Inc. (Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Article 29 Letter], https://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/press/ 
Letter_from_the_Article_29_Working_Party_to_Google_in_relation_to_its_new_privacy_policy.pdf. 
 138.  E.g., Article 29 Main Findings, supra note 91. 
 139.  The conference was held in Berlin on May 12 and 13, 2014.  The website for this annual conference 
can be found at http://www.euroforum.de/edpd. 
No. 2] LESSONS FROM CLOUD INVESTIGATIONS 263 
personal data.  I interviewed EU DPAs140 and Cloud Providers141 that had 
direct experience of Cloud Investigations.  I also interviewed the European 
institutions that played key roles in discussing and promulgating the current 
and future European data protection laws.142 
I identified over twenty143 potential respondents from these three 
categories of actors by considering the following factors: 
 The applicable administrative rules; 
 The investigative powers of the EU DPAs; 
 The EU DPAs’ sizes; 
 The offerings of the Cloud Providers (for example, single service 
or technology, suite of services or technologies, target market, 
etc.); and 
 The ease of access to the respondents. 
This sampling strategy enabled me to interview respondents whose 
experiences were directly relevant to my research questions.144  After obtaining 
institutional ethical approval, I approached the potential respondents in person, 
by e-mail, or through social media communications.145 
 
 140.  Interview with the Commissioner of one EU DPA (May 30, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 1]; 
interview with a senior official of another EU DPA (July 25, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 2]; interview with a 
senior official of another EU DPA (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 3]; interview with a senior official of 
another EU DPA (July 8, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 4]; interview with a senior official of another EU DPA 
(July 11, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 5]; interview with a senior official of another EU DPA (June 6, 2014) 
[hereinafter Interview 9]; interview with a senior official of another EU DPA (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter 
Interview 14]; interview with the head of department of the team of a DPA that conducts Cloud Investigations 
(Dec. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 15] [collectively, hereinafter EU DPA Interviews]. 
 141.  Interview with a senior legal counsel of one large multinational Cloud Provider (July 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter Interview 10]; interview with a senior legal counsel of another large multinational Cloud Provider 
(July 8, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 11]; interview with a senior legal counsel of another popular 
multinational Cloud Provider (Sept. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 12]; interview with another large 
multinational Cloud Provider (Nov. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Interview 13] [collectively, Cloud Provider 
Interviews]. 
 142.  Interview with a senior representative of one European institution (July 11, 2014) [hereinafter 
Interview 7); interview with a senior representative of another European institution (June 26, 2014) 
[hereinafter Interview 8] [collectively, hereinafter European Institution Interviews]. 
 143.  There are no rules governing the minimum acceptable sampling size for qualitative interviews. See, 
e.g., Carol A.B. Warren, Qualitative Interviewing, in HANDBOOK OF INTERVIEW RESEARCH: CONTEXT AND 
METHOD 83, 99 (Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein eds., 2002) (suggesting that twenty to thirty 
interviews support valid conclusions).  However, others argue that fewer than sixty interviews cannot be used 
to generate valid conclusions. See, e.g., Kathleen Gerson & Ruth Horowitz, Observation and Interviewing: 
Options and Choices in Qualitative Research, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN ACTION 199, 223 (Tim May ed., 
2002).  The general rule of thumb is that the adequate number of qualitative interviews for a research project is 
always context-specific. ROSALIND EDWARDS & JANET HOLLAND, WHAT IS QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING? 5–7 
(2013); Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie & Nancy L. Leech, Sampling Designs in Qualitative Research: Making the 
Sampling Process More Public, 12 QUALITATIVE REP. 238, 240–42 (2007).  The sample size should not be too 
small to prevent data saturation, theoretical saturation, or informational redundancy. ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL 
RESEARCH METHODS 425 (4th ed. 2012).  Additionally, the sample size should not be so large that the 
researcher is unable to understand the object of study in depth. Id.  In my present research project, ten to 
twenty interviews would provide a valid sample, as Cloud Investigations in Europe are a recent phenomenon.  
Thus, I targeted respondents whose activities are directly relevant to my research questions.  For more on the 
virtues of a small sample (under twenty), see Mira Crouch & Heather McKenzie, The Logic of Small Samples 
in Interview-Based Qualitative Research, 45 SOC. SCI. INFO. 483 (2006). 
 144.  For more on purposive sampling and its validity, see BRYMAN, supra note 143, at 416–28. 
 145.  See Letter from the Research Ethics Comm., Queen Mary Univ. of London, to author (May 21, 
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Subsequently, I conducted fourteen interviews with DPAs,146 Cloud 
Providers,147 and European institutions148 over several days from May 2014 to 
December 2014.  I ensured that my interview sample was valid by, for 
example, relying on multiple data sources to support a conclusion.  All of my 
interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis over the telephone or by 
Skype, depending on the respondent’s availability.  Consequently, I am unable 
to provide any information that identifies my respondents, including a list of 
the interviewed organizations.  Most interviews lasted one hour, were 
audiotaped when the respondent consented, and were fully transcribed.  When 
transcribing the interviews, I ensured that the transcriptions were as close to 
the interviews as possible by, for example, minimally tidying up the text.  I 
explored various themes during the interviews, including the relationships 
between the actors during Cloud Investigations and the factors that affect 
Cloud Investigations (for example, the attitudes of Cloud Providers).  I adopted 
flexible and non-leading interviewing techniques to ensure that the respondents 
could tell their own stories of Cloud Investigations.  I used multiple strategies 
to manage difficult interviews.  For example, when I had to ask commercially 
or legally sensitive questions, such as when I queried the links between the 
Snowden revelations and Cloud Investigations, I phrased these questions 
carefully so that the respondents did not clam up.149 
I used the following techniques to ensure that my data analysis was 
rigorous: 
 Explanation building;  
 Generating explanatory descriptive themes and sub-themes; 
 Evaluating how the themes and sub-themes relate to one 
another; 
 Using theoretical notions (such as “action at distance”) to 
generate more abstract themes; and 
 Searching for empirical data that challenged my theoretical and 
empirical assumptions to ensure that my data analysis was valid. 
Having explained my methodology, in the next Part, I examine some of 
my empirical findings on how data protection laws are used during Cloud 
Investigations. 
 
2014) (granting ethical approval) (on file with author). 
 146.  Cloud Provider Interviews, supra note 141. 
 147.  EU DPA Interviews, supra note 140. 
 148.  European Institution Interviews, supra note 142.  
 149.  Edward Snowden is a former contractor of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Edward 
Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-us-canada-23123964.  In June 2013, Mr. Snowden leaked the details of extensive Internet and phone 
surveillance by the NSA. Id.  These leaks were followed by further revelations in several newspapers that the 
NSA directly tapped into the servers of various Internet companies, including multinational Cloud Providers, 
such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, to track online communications. Id. 
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VI. STRATEGIC USE OF DATA PROTECTION LAWS: BARGAINING 
ENFORCEMENT 
In this Part, I analyze how data protection laws can often be strategically 
deployed during Cloud Investigations by the regulator and regulatee to 
advance or stall negotiations.  Even in cases where the strategic use of laws 
achieves the aims of the legislators, for example, compliance with the Data 
Protection Directive (as nationally implemented), such laws are often not 
deployed in the manner intended by the lawmakers. 
To achieve the aims of this Article, selectivity is key, if not essential.  
There are no doubt cases in which data protection laws are used by EU DPAs 
during Cloud Investigations in the ways envisaged by lawmakers, for example, 
to sanction a data breach.  However, during my interviews, the respondents 
have elaborated mostly on the situations where data protection laws have been 
used in ways not envisaged by the lawmakers.  Consequently, I focus in detail 
on such strategic uses of data protection laws during Cloud Investigations.  
Notwithstanding, this does not mean that data protection laws are not used in 
the ways intended by the legislative draftsperson during Cloud Investigations. 
My data analysis suggests that both EU DPAs and Cloud Providers can 
often use data protection laws as bargaining chips during Cloud Investigations.  
This practice may have evolved out of the broad and discretionary powers of 
EU DPAs, which means that they can deploy many techniques, including 
negotiations, to achieve legal and regulatory compliance.  Likewise, the time 
frame of Cloud Investigations—typically one to two years150—means that both 
parties develop a longstanding relationship that can often be distinct from other 
regulatory relationships, such as the relationship between the Cloud Provider 
and the judge in a lawsuit, where enforcement is often a once-and-only type 
decision. 
My data analysis highlights four possible bargaining scenarios.  In the 
first scenario, the EU DPA uses threats of fines, lawsuits, or similar 
enforcement actions under data protection laws to persuade the Cloud Provider 
to agree to its recommendations during Cloud Investigations.151  This is the 
classic example of law’s coercive power being invoked to bring about a change 
in the behavior of the regulatee.  Depending on how the Cloud Provider 
responds, such threats can eventually turn into action as the “last resort” to 
generate the company’s legal compliance.152 
In the second scenario, the EU DPA seeks to persuade the Cloud Provider 
to change its processing operations and policies by suggesting that doing so 
would persuade the EU DPA to refrain from exercising its full legal powers 
concerning a detected data breach.153  Several factors, such as the severity of 
the data breach and how the Cloud Provider responds to the regulator, may 
 
 150.  See EU DPA Interviews, supra note 140; Cloud Provider Interviews, supra note 141. 
 151.  See, e.g., Interviews 2 & 3, supra note 140. 
 152.  Cloud Provider Interviews, supra note 141. 
 153.  See, e.g., Interview 1, supra note 140. 
266 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY [Vol. 2016 
lead to this bargaining scenario.  For example, if the EU DPA concludes that 
the Cloud Provider has not provided its users with clear and transparent 
information to explain why certain categories of “personal data” are being 
processed by the organization in its policies, the EU DPA may seek to cajole 
the Cloud Provider to amend the wording of its policies.  It would do this by 
promising that it will not sanction the organization for this breach if the 
company makes the amendment within a given time frame, the alternative 
being for the EU DPA to impose a sanction straightaway.  However, in reality 
this promise may not be worth as much as it might appear to, because many 
EU DPAs often attempt to investigate and resolve some of the data protection 
complaints filed by individuals during their Cloud Investigations.154  In such 
cases, if the complainant is not satisfied with the outcomes of the Cloud 
Investigations (as they relate to his or her complaint), the EU DPA often has to 
formally investigate the complaint after the Cloud Investigation by using a 
separate procedure.155  In effect, this means that although the Cloud Provider 
may have been persuaded to implement specific operational or policy changes 
during the Cloud Investigation on the basis that the EU DPA would not 
exercise its full legal powers, the provider can at times find itself in a situation 
in which this changes later.  It is not clear to what extent both parties articulate 
this contingency during their negotiations.156 
In the third scenario, the EU DPA seeks to persuade the Cloud Provider 
to comply with measures that are not within the ambit of national data 
protection laws by offering extended benefits.  Examples of extended benefits 
include an EU DPA publicly acknowledging that the Cloud Provider has fully 
cooperated with the regulator during the Cloud Investigation or an EU DPA 
positively phrasing the Cloud Provider’s compliance with the law in public 
documents, such as the reports published at the end of the investigation.157  
Some EU DPAs may even publish reports that have been partly drafted by the 
investigated organization.158  As one of the EU DPA respondents says: “If you 
[the Cloud Provider] want us [the EU DPA] to phrase it [your compliance] that 
way rather than another one, why should we care? . . .  If we get the substance 
of what we want we don’t care . . . how it is presented.”159 
In the final scenario, the Cloud Provider can often use legislative 
provisions to stall negotiations.  For instance, in some Cloud Investigations, 
Cloud Providers argue that they do not fall within the “establishment” 
provision of the Data Protection Directive (as nationally implemented) and that 
the EU DPA has no jurisdiction over its activities.160  Such companies can 
 
 154.  EU DPA Interviews, supra note 140. 
 155.  See, e.g., Data Protection Act 1988 (Act No. 25/1988) (Ir.), amended by Data Protection 
(Amendment) Act 2003 (Act. No. 6/2003) (Ir.), http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=796 
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often capitalize on some of the uncertainties that arise in the transnational 
context, in which it may not always be clear where the Cloud Provider is in 
fact “established” for the purposes of the Data Protection Directive.  Under 
Article 4(1) of the Data Protection Directive, each EEA country has an 
obligation to apply the Data Protection Directive (as implemented nationally) 
if: 
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member 
State; when the same controller is established on the territory of 
several Member States, he must take the necessary measures to 
ensure that each of these establishments complies with the 
obligations laid down by the national law applicable; 
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State’s territory, 
but in a place where its national law applies by virtue of 
international public law; 
(c) the controller is not established on Community territory and for 
purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, 
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said 
Member State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes 
of transit through the territory of the Community.161 
As with other aspects of the Data Protection Directive, Article 4 suffers 
from several weaknesses.  Article 4 is vague as it contains a number of unclear 
phrases, such as “in the context of the activities of an establishment of the 
controller.”162  Article 4 has also been inconsistently implemented in the 
EEA.163  In the cloud context, the concept of “establishment” can often be very 
problematic as it can often be difficult to determine where a “data controller” is 
“established” due to the complex cloud chain.164  Occasionally, a Cloud 
Provider can question the legitimacy of the Cloud Investigation by arguing that 
the EU DPA does not have authority to regulate its activities because the 
company is not “established” in its jurisdiction within the meaning of the Data 
Protection Directive (as nationally implemented).165  Legitimacy means that 
the EU DPA “is perceived as having a right to govern both by those it seeks to 
govern and those on behalf of whom it purports to govern.”166  The legitimacy 
argument also raises accountability questions, such as on whose behalf the EU 
DPAs are acting and whether the EU DPA has the right to call them to 
account.  Here, the Cloud Providers use such arguments to either stall the 
negotiations or attempt to gain the upper hand during the negotiations.167 
 
 161.  Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 4(1). 
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Having analyzed how EU DPAs and Cloud Providers can often use data 
protection laws as bargaining chips during Cloud Investigations, next I analyze 
the roles of data protection laws in generating “centers of calculations” during 
Cloud Investigations.  “Centers of calculations” are crucial zones of analysis 
because decisions about legal compliance are made in these spaces.168 
VII.   MULTIPLE CENTERS OF REGULATION 
In this Part, I evaluate how multiple calculations rather than only legal 
ones come together to generate regulatory effects, such as bringing the Cloud 
Providers’ processing operations in line with the relevant laws.  This analysis 
supports my contention that law can play variable roles during Cloud 
Investigations, depending on several factors, including the processing 
operations of the Cloud Providers, the aims and foci of the Cloud 
Investigations, the socio-political context, and so on.  Sometimes law can be at 
the forefront of activity during Cloud Investigations while at other times law 
can retreat slightly from sight in the field of action as other actors carry out the 
act of “government.”  What are the centers of calculations commonly involved 
during Cloud Investigations?  How do such centers of calculation enable 
“action at a distance” in the sense of enabling the EU DPA?  I address these 
questions in this Part by examining some of the main calculations that can 
often be involved during some of the stages of Cloud Investigations. 
A. The Three Stages of Cloud Investigations 
Before delving into this matter, it would be useful if I explained my 
empirical findings on the three main stages of Cloud Investigations, namely, 
the pre-investigative, investigative, and post-investigative stages.169  Generally 
speaking, the particular details of these three stages may vary depending on the 
aims and foci of the investigations, the applicable procedural laws, the national 
data protection laws, and so on. 
Typically, the pre-investigative stage covers all the actions of the relevant 
parties that lead to the investigative stage.  Depending on context, a number of 
matters can take place during the pre-investigative stage.  For example, some 
EU DPAs can start to engage with the Cloud Provider through e-mail 
exchanges and conference calls to inform the company that the regulator may 
wish to formally investigate the organization in the forthcoming months.170  
Other EU DPAs provide the Cloud Providers with detailed information about 
the subsequent investigative process and how they can get ready for the 
forthcoming investigation.171  Other EU DPAs can spend quite a lot of time 
during this stage to understand the business model, processing operations, and 
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corporate structure of the company.172 
The investigative stage starts when the EU DPA formally initiates the 
Cloud Investigation by, for example, sending a letter of intention to investigate 
to the Cloud Provider, and ends when the report is finalized and/or published 
(not all reports are published).  This stage has three main aspects, which can be 
iterative, namely, fact-finding, negotiations, and decision-making.  Typically at 
the start of the investigative stage, the EU DPA gathers evidence about the 
Cloud Provider’s compliance with data protection laws.  The types of evidence 
collected vary depending on the context in question but can include internal 
and external data protection documents, algorithmic sequences performing a 
specific operation, such as data deletion, and so on. 
Based on its review of such evidence and its discussion with the Cloud 
Provider, the EU DPA then decides about the provider’s compliance in its 
processing operations and policies with the relevant laws.173  Cloud Providers 
play an active role during the investigative stage by, for example, providing the 
EU DPAs with the relevant evidence, challenging how EU DPAs understand 
their operations, and clarifying their policies.174  Toward the end of the 
investigative stage, many EU DPAs usually reach preliminary decisions about 
the data protection compliance of the organization.175  Such decisions are 
either finalized or amended following negotiations with the Cloud Provider.176  
Typically, when negotiations take place during a Cloud Investigation, they can 
be quite lengthy, as both parties seek to reach mutually acceptable solutions.  
These are data protection solutions that bring the Cloud Provider’s operations 
and policies in line with the relevant laws and do not damage the business 
interests of the company.  Once the EU DPA has reached a final decision about 
the Cloud Provider’s data protection compliance, the regulator details the 
findings of the Cloud Investigation in a lengthy report, with its 
recommendations and the timetable for the implementation of the 
recommendations.177  Depending on the circumstances in question, the report 
can be either privately or publicly disseminated.178 
Finally, the post-investigative stage refers to the period following the 
dissemination (whether internal or external) of the investigation report.179  
Typically at this point, the EU DPA monitors whether the Cloud Provider is 
implementing its recommendations within the set time frame.180  The Cloud 
Provider can also ask the EU DPA for further practical advice on how to 
implement certain recommendations or advice on future changes to its 
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processing operations or policies.181 
So what accounts of compliance are produced during these different 
stages of Cloud Investigations?  By whom?  I answer these questions next by 
focusing on some of the typical accounts of compliance that are produced 
during the pre-investigative and investigative stages of Cloud Investigations.  I 
do not analyze the accounts of compliance involved post-investigation, 
because many Cloud Investigations are in the early stages of post-
investigation.  Consequently, I do not have enough data to evaluate 
comprehensively the “centers of calculation” involved during this phase. 
B. Generating Compliance Accounts During Cloud Investigations 
During the pre-investigative phase, multiple accounts of compliance can 
be generated by different actors depending on the investigation in question.  
For instance, an EU DPA that is unfamiliar with the data processing operations 
and business model of a Cloud Provider may engage in substantial discussions 
with various teams of the Cloud Provider, such as management, engineering, 
and legal, to know more about the entity it will regulate later.182  Such 
discussions often generate several accounts of compliance; which involve 
various types of information, data protection policies, staff guidance on all 
aspects of data protection, and privacy permission screens.183  Such discussions 
often generate several accounts of compliance, which involve various types of 
information, data protection policies, staff guidance on all aspects of data 
protection, and privacy permission screens.184  Other “centers of calculations” 
can also be involved, including identifying the accounts of compliance that the 
company will need to provide to the regulator during the subsequent 
investigative stage, establishing the types of evidence that support these 
compliance accounts (such as data logs), and pinpointing the locations of such 
evidence.185  This can often be tricky in cloud ecosystems.186  Formal data 
protection laws can often underpin various calculations, such as evaluating the 
data protection compliance accounts that the organization needs to provide to 
the regulator by referring to the relevant legislative framework.  However, and 
crucially for our purposes, the production of such accounts, which can often be 
vital to the regulator during the subsequent investigative stage, depends on 
other actors, who may or may not bring particular legal considerations with 
them when carrying out such tasks. 
During the investigative stage, other accounts of compliance are 
generated, often by similar and at times new actors.  For instance, depending 
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on the aims and foci of the Cloud Investigation, the EU DPA may seek 
accounts of how specific technical functions, such as the encryption of 
messages, are performed to evaluate whether the Cloud Provider complies with 
its security and confidentiality obligations under the relevant national laws.187  
Here, multiple centers of calculation produce different accounts of how this 
specific security measure operates in practice.  As an example, the legal team 
of the Cloud Provider generates an account of the organization’s encryption 
policies as set out in its internal and external documents.  The technical team of 
the Cloud Provider produces a different account of how encryption operates at 
a technical level.  Such technical accounts may focus on key issues, including 
the encryption method, encryption key length, key access, the points at which 
data are encrypted, and whether the whole or part of the dataset is encrypted.  
Although data protection laws can often constitute some of the accounts, as 
with the pre-investigative phase, the production of these accounts does not 
depend solely on legal actors or factors. 
Durable and mobile “inscriptions” become key here in enabling “action at 
a distance” because such inscriptions are later “acted upon” by other actors.  
For instance, if the data retention or deletion practices of the Cloud Provider 
are under scrutiny by the EU DPA, the technical team of the Cloud Provider 
often has to provide the regulator with detailed information of its storage 
options.188  Typically, such information can be provided by a table or similar 
diagram that particularizes the stored data types, their formats, and their 
locations (for example, /data/data subdirectory or /mnt/sdcard).189  This table is 
mobile since it can easily traverse different spaces, like the technical and legal 
team of the Cloud Provider, the sub-contractor of the EU DPAs, and so on, 
through instantaneous means, such as electronic mail, without being altered.  
These “inscriptions” play an important part in regulating “personal data” 
because they provide to the regulator reliable information on specific 
processing operations, such as the Cloud Provider’s storage practices.  If this 
information was not reliably transmitted to the regulator, the latter would be 
unable to assess whether, and to what extent, the Cloud Provider’s storage 
policies comply with the relevant laws.  These diverse compliance accounts are 
then reviewed or tested by many actors on the EU DPA end to evaluate to what 
extent the Cloud Provider adheres to data protection laws.190 
Many EU DPAs can also collect other forms of evidence during the 
investigative stages by using various actors.  The precise actors involved 
depend on a number of considerations, including how the EU DPA organizes 
its operations and the EU DPA’s resources.  Some EU DPAs with a limited 
number of staff may employ sub-contractors to test whether all the relevant 
algorithmic codes operate in the manner set out in the data or security policies 
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of the Cloud Provider.191  The sub-contractors provide a detailed account of 
each operation that has been technically tested, in a durable and mobile 
medium, such as a report, which is then later “acted upon” by the EU DPA.192  
Other EU DPAs may ask specialist state agencies, such as the Financial Police, 
to inspect the premises and servers of the Cloud Provider.193  Despite the 
divergence in terms of the actors involved during the fact-finding phase of an 
investigation, typically these actors review particular aspects of compliance, 
such as how the Cloud Provider handles personal information on a technical 
level, rather than conduct an overarching review of compliance, which happens 
later in the investigation. 
As I mentioned earlier, although data protection laws underpin several 
aspects of these evaluations, such as determining which technical operations 
should be examined, the focus here can often be very much on examining key 
matters, for example, how cookie installation and deletion work in practice.  
Particular modes of inquiries, for instance real-time evaluation of how the staff 
of the Cloud Providers deals with security and data protection concerns, can 
often be used here to determine data protection compliance rather than merely 
reviewing a privacy policy.  EU DPAs that use such types of inquiries tend to 
have either a higher or equal number of technically trained staff, as opposed to 
legally trained staff, to determine if the Cloud Provider is “accountable in 
reality” (my emphasis).194  Having said that, the precise mix of legal and 
technical staff deployed in a Cloud Investigation depends on several factors, 
including the EU DPA’s resources, the technical complexity of the 
investigation, and the stage of the investigation.  Some EU DPAs use an equal 
mix of legal and technical staff.195  Other EU DPAs may deploy more technical 
rather than legal staff during their Cloud Investigations.196  For others still, the 
legal staff can often take a backseat role during the fact-finding phase of the 
investigations as the technical staff carries out most of the evaluation.  Here, 
the legal staff tends to take on a more significant role during the decision-
making and negotiation stages.197  Consequently, for such EU DPAs during the 
early phases of Cloud Investigations, formal data protection laws may not 
always be visible in the field of action although they operate in the 
background. 
For many EU DPAs, even when they have reached the later stages of the 
investigation and are forming overarching decisions about the Cloud 
Provider’s legal compliance, they focus on whether the company is 
accountable in reality rather than whether the organization has only 
implemented data protection laws in its “fancy privacy policy.”198  As one of 
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the EU DPA respondents says: 
We tend to be substance-oriented people . . . .  We want to find out 
in reality are you implementing the law?  So we certainly will read 
your privacy policy but that is not necessarily our focus . . . .  We 
often hear the criticism that some EU DPAs are just focused on 
legal.  We are not.  We are focused on substance.  So our approach 
is show me . . . .  Show me what you are doing with the data.  
What’s the security?  Does this person have access to this data?  
Why?  What do you mean you are providing access to this data to 
those people?  So we will certainly be checking the legal basis but 
it’s the legal basis for the substance.  We will not spend hours 
agonizing over the finer points of your privacy policy.  Your privacy 
policy is only your starting point.  We are focusing on: is this 
company in reality accountable?  Not, does it have a fancy privacy 
policy?199 
The above extract is very significant as it illustrates that many EU DPAs 
focus on whether (and to what extent) the Cloud Provider can demonstrate 
legal compliance in reality. 
These multiple accounts are examined by the EU DPA toward the end of 
the Cloud Investigation to determine the compliance of the Cloud Provider  
with the relevant data protection laws.200  Here, there is evidently a very close 
link between the accounts produced during the Cloud Investigation and the 
outcomes of the Cloud Investigations.  Outcomes include the compliance 
recommendations of the EU DPAs.  This does not mean that accounts of 
compliance cannot be constructed in specific ways so that a particular version 
of compliance is generated, especially when the report produced at the end of 
the Cloud Investigation is published. 
From the above, we can understand that data protection laws do not have 
privileged or static roles during Cloud Investigations.  At times, law can be at 
the forefront of the activity during the Cloud Investigations, for instance, to 
determine the applicable norm.  At other times, law works in conjunction with 
other elements, such as technological and social ones, to generate compliance 
accounts and, ultimately, regulation.  For example, an inquiry into the data 
minimization procedures of the Cloud Provider is an account that focuses on 
legal, technological, and social matters such as the management’s involvement 
in designing technologies or policies that protect personal data, the data 
minimization rule, and the technical personal data processing operations. 
VIII.    CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have advanced two main arguments.  First, during Cloud 
Investigations, EU DPAs and the Cloud Providers can use the legal framework 
to achieve multiple ends, some of which are not (explicitly at least) embodied 
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in the law itself.  Second, I have argued that it should not be assumed that data 
protection laws dominate the investigative process at all times.  Rather, such 
conclusions should be based on empirical evidence because at times law can 
disappear from view as other local actors participate in the regulatory process.  
In many Cloud Investigations the focus is not always on law as it appears in 
the relevant statute but rather on whether and to what extent the Cloud 
Provider is “accountable in reality.”201  Determining real accountability means 
relying on complex modes of inquiries, such as technical testing and real-time 
evaluation of the alignment between the Cloud Provider’s processing 
operations and policies, which can shed light on how the organization operates 
in practice rather than in theory. 
Going forward, three points should be borne in mind.  Although it may be 
acceptable (although not desirable) for EU DPAs to rely on the truthfulness of 
the accounts provided by the Cloud Providers during an investigation, without 
requiring detailed supporting evidence, this practice is likely to become less 
acceptable when the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies in 
May 2018.  In particular, the GDPR’s explicit recognition of accountability,202 
enhanced rights for “data subjects,”203 and stricter obligations for both 
“controllers” and “processors”204 mean that Cloud Providers will inevitably 
have to provide their regulators with more detailed and reliable evidence of 
their legal compliance.  As an example, nowadays, even in cases where the EU 
DPA reviews portions of the algorithms to determine whether the processing 
operations of the Cloud Provider complies with the law, the EU DPA has to 
trust that the company has provided the regulator with the algorithmic 
sequence that is actually implemented.  Consequently, one of the tasks ahead is 
to evaluate how EU DPAs can obtain suitable and adequate accounts of 
compliance during investigations. 
Related, a second task ahead is for EU DPAs to provide guidance to 
investigated companies on the appropriate measures, tools, and practices that 
they should adopt in order to comply with and demonstrate their compliance 
with data protection laws to relevant stakeholders, such as the EU DPAs and 
the data subjects.  DPAs should act in concert with one another when 
producing such guidance in order to promote a transnational approach to 
compliance as well as reduce legal uncertainty, legal inconsistency, and 
compliance costs.  Finally, if Cloud Investigations are to achieve their 
regulatory aims, it is important that EU DPAs investigate cloud-centric issues 
during their Cloud Investigations rather than only general data protection 
issues.  Currently, data protection issues specific to the cloud, such as data 
deletion in highly fragmented ecosystems, are not adequately scrutinized 
during Cloud Investigations. 
In all likelihood, as cloud computing is adopted more widely in Europe, it 
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is inevitable that more cloud-based companies will come under the scrutiny of 
European regulators.  By ignoring cloud-centric issues during Cloud 
Investigations, EU DPAs are at severe risk of ignoring key data protection 
concerns raised by particular cloud ecosystems and obtaining only partial 
views of compliance during the investigative process.  This also has serious 
implications for the trust of the public in the efficacy of the investigative 
process in obtaining a full account of the compliance of the Cloud Provider 
with the relevant data protection laws. 
 
